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POINT I
THE DECISION OF THE COURT WILL NOT REPEAL
LONG-STANDING RULES CONCERNING MORTGAGE
FORECLOSURE.
The primary thrust of the Respondents' petition for
rehearing is that the court's decision will inexorably repeal
a long-standing rule of the court that the mortgagor or his
grantee is entitled to the use of the mortgaged property until
the sheriff's sale is final.

The Respondents are obviously

referring to the court's statement that the Clawsons' title
was defunct, and that it could not be revitalized by any
redemption by Spaulding.
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It is the law that a mortgage foreclosure extinguishes all interests inferior to that of the mortgage foreclosed and, in deed, the judgment of foreclosure in the
present case expressly stated that the Clawsons lost all
interest and title to the property in question.

This same

point was brought out in Appellants' Brief at pp. 5 through 10.
An additional authority expressing the same rule in express
terms is the follows:
A judgment or decree of foreclosure concludes the rights of a claimant under a
legal title adverse to that of the mortgagor and mortgagee where such rights were
properly made the subject of adjudication
in the foreclosure proceeding. 59 C.J.S.
Mortgages §704(d).
To rephrase the question that has apparently caused
so much consternation among the Respondents, "What then becomes
of the title to the property between the time of sale and
the time of redemption?"

The answer to that question will

not repeal any long-standing rule of law in the State of Utah.
On the contrary, it is stated succinctly at 59 C.J.S. Mortgages
§520 (1949).
A completed foreclosure divests the mortgagor's title to the mortgaged premises
and vests it in the mortgagee or purchaser.
A footnote to that same section clarifies the situation even
further.

59 C.J.S., supra, 849-50 n.62, recites the holding

of In Re Nelson:
Mortgage foreclosure sale and sheriff's
certificate of sale extinguished all of >
mortgagor's property in realty involved,
except bare legal title with statutory
Digitized
by the Howard
W. Hunter Law Library,and
J. Reuben
Clark Law School, BYU.
rights
of possession
redemption.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Between the time of judgment and the time of redemption, then, the property is in the custody of the court with
certain statutory rights resting in the mortgagor or his
grantee (possession, redemption), and with certain statutory
rights resting in the mortgagee or purchaser (sale, redemption,
elimination of all inferior interests, equitable title).
The court's decision in this case will not overrule
the long-standing principle that:
The landowner's title and right to possession,
use and benefit of property sold on mortgage foreclosure or execution sale is reserved to him during the redemption period
and until the sheriff's deed. (Res. Petition
for Rehearing and Brief in Support Thereof,
p. 1)
The court's decision does not repeal any long-standing rules concerning mortgage foreclosure.

The elements of

title remain divided, as stated, and the property rests in
the custody of the court pending disposition.

POINT II
THE DECISION OF THE COURT WAS MADE ON THE
BASIS OF A THEORY PROPERLY SUBMITTED BEFORE
THE COURT IN BOTH BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT,
AND A REHEARING CANNOT BE GRANTED MERELY
TO ALLOW RESPONDENTS THE LUXURY OF FILING
ADDITIONAL BRIEFS AND RE-ARGUING POINTS
ALREADY ARGUED AND ADJUDGED.
As pointed out above, Point I of Appellants' Brief
goes directly to the question of the vitality of the Clawsons'
defunct claim.

The matter has already been submitted to the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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court in both brief and oral form.

Appellants' Brief devotes

five pages to the defunct nature of the Clawsons1 claim, and
Appellants were, careful to point out in oral argument that the
foreclosure judgment expressly extinguished all claims or interests
of the Clawsons.

The fact that Respondents chose not to address

themselves to that question in their brief does not entitle them
to a rehearing at this time for the purpose of re-arguing a
matter already submitted, or for filing an additional brief.
The law is clear that a rehearing will not be ordered so that
one party can re-argue an issue already submitted to the court.
It is stated at 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error §1411 (1958):
If no omissions or new authorities or points
of law or fact are shown, the appellate court
will seldom permit a rehearing simply for the
purpose of obtaining a re-argument on, and a
reconsideration of, points, authorities and
matters which have already been fully considered
by the court, on the assertion of counsel that,
notwithstanding the court fully considered everything wished to be urged on the rehearing, it
reached the wrong conclusion. Id. 540.
In the present case the Respondents are arguing no new
facts, and the great majority of the cases cited by them have
already been cited by the parties hereto in their respective briefs.
The only new cases cited by the Respondents are the Carlquist,
Layton and Local Realty cases, and all of those cases simply
restate hornbook law on redemption.
to the question before the court.

The cases are inapplicable
For the same reason it. is also

held that
. . .a rehearing will not be granted. . . ,,.
to enable. . .additional briefs to be filed. . . .
Id. 541.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The cases in support of this point are numerous, and
several from this region are worthy of note.

In Phelps Dodge

Corporation v.,Industrial Commission, 90 Ariz. 379, 368 P.2d 450
(1962), the court stated:
A rehearing is not granted to re-argue
matters determined by the decision.
/Citations omitted^/ Id. 452.
In Climate Control, Inc., v. Hill, 87 Ariz. 201, 349
P.2d 771 (1960), the court stated:
Finally, Appellant has advanced other
grounds for reversing this court's
decision. They consist primarily of
a re-argument of its initial position.
By long-established rule of court they
are not grounds for reconsideration.
/Citation omitted./ Id. 773.
In Town of Glenrock v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway
Company, 73 Wyo. 395, 281 P.2d 455 (1955), the court stated:
This court has previously pointed out
that when the reason advanced for a rehearing is simply re-argument and repetition
of counsel's views which have already received consideration, we_will decline to __
re-travel those paths. /Citation omitted^/
Id. 456.
And, in London Guaranty and Accident Company v. Officer,
78 Colo. 441, 242 P. 989 (1926), the court apparently became
quite aggravated with the petitioner in a similar situation:
In addition thereto, that portion of the application contains nothing new, but is a mere reargument of the questions as heretofore presented. It is, therefore, a gross violation
of the rule of this court, and, in addition,
is so discourteous as to merit at least the
disposition now made of it. The application
is stricken from the files. Rehearing is >
denied. Id. 995.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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It has previously been pointed out that Appellants
devoted five pages of their Brief to the question now raised'
by. Respondents, and it has also been pointed out that Respondents chose to respond only peripherally to that issue, at
p. 18 of their Brief.

Respondents now apparently wish to

re-argue that point and to file a brief of authorities relative
thereto.

This cannot be done.
Ordinarily a rehearing will not be granted
merely because of the failure of counsel
sufficiently to present the cause for the
determination of the appellate court. Accordingly, all points relied on must be
presented originally, rather than reserved
to be urged on the court in the event of
an adverse decision, and a rehearing will
not be granted because of the petitioner's
failure to argue or present important
points on hearing. . . . 5 C.J.S. Appeal
and Error §1417, 545 (1958).
It has been held on several occasions and in several

jurisdictions that a rehearing will not be ordered merely to
allow additional argument on the issues originally presented
to the court.

In Rice v. Bennington County Savings Bank,

93 Vt. 493, 108 A. 708 (1920), it was stated:
Moreover, it is a general rule that
failure to present a case fully or to
give sufficient attention to the argument on a former hearing does not, in
a court of last resort, afford ground
for granting a new trial. Id. 716.
In New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Luddeke, 72 S.W.2d 942
(Tex.Civ.App., 1934), the Texas court has explained quite
concisely why a petitioner will not be allowed to cure the
defects of his original brief through a rehearing.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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The defects in and omissions from Appellant's
brief, and pointed out in the original opinion,
are sought to be cured and supplied in the
motion for rehearing* But that effort comes
too late. Parties are bound by and restricted
to presentation in their briefs. Any other
rule would result in disorder, confusion,
delays, the disruption of orderly procedure
in this court. This is to£ obvious to require
argument to support it. /citations omitted/
Id. 944.
The question raised by Respondents has already
been heard and adjudged by this court, and Respondents cannot
now request a rehearing for the purpose of re-arguing that
same question in slightly altered form.
POINT III
A REHEARING CANNOT BE GRANTED MERELY BECAUSE
THE QUESTION IS IMPORTANT.
Respondents are mistaken when they point to the
supposedly awesome ramifications of the court's decision in
this case.

Respondents state:

But to characterize Clawsons' claim as
defunct would unintentionally obliterate
a fundamental right which has been established for many years in this state:
the right to possession, use and the rents
and profits of the mortgaged estate, during
the period of redemption. (Res. Brief in
Support of Rehearing, p.2.)
Simply stated, Respondents are wrong.

It has pre-

viously been pointed out that no rights will be obliterated.
The title to the property becomes divided upon judgment of
foreclosure, with only the barest legal title remaining in
the mortgagor.

The equitable title to the property vests in

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the court pending disposition of the property and finally comes
to rest in the mortgagee, redemptioner or purchaser at sale.
As stated in In Re Nelson, supra, no rights of the mortgagor
or his grantees are "obliterated".

The rights are created by

statute and they remain viable.
However, even were this question to hold the unassailable significance which Respondents apparently attribute to it,
such would not be grounds for rehearing.

It is stated at

5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error, §1418 (1958):
A rehearing ordinarily will not be granted
because the question is of great importance,
unless it appears to have been decided
without due consideration.
The court's decision in the present case was proper,
and it is obvious from the briefs, oral argument, and the opinion
of this court that this question was given due consideration.
POINT IV
A REHEARING CANNOT BE GRANTED MERELY BECAUSE THE
COURT'S DECISION APPEARS TO BE OUT OF HARMONY WITH
PRIOR DECISIONS OF THE COURT.
It must first be stated that the opinion of this court
is not out of harmony with prior decisions made by this court.
Respondents are attempting to twist a few words of this cdurt's
decision into a total reversal of the Utah mortgage law.

The

court's decision will not alter the statutory right to possession
during the redemption period, and Respondents' argument is simply
a pretext for requesting a chance to re-argue the same issues.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Those cases cited by Respondents apply only to the statutory.
right of redemption and are only peripherally related to the
question now. before the court.

It is clear that the present

case can be easily distinguished from the cases on which
Respondents rest.

Consequently, a rehearing cannot be granted.

A rehearing will not be granted on the
ground that the decision of the appellate
court is out of harmony with certain former decisions cited in the rehearing petition where such former decisions do not
justify a ruling different from that
rendered, or are substantially distinguishable. 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error,
§1424 (1958).
The court's decision in the present case is not
out of harmony with its former decisions as cited by Respondents
for the reason that this case is substantially distinguishable
from the cases cited.
CONCLUSION
Respondents' concern that the court's decision in
this matter will completely reverse the present Utah mortgage
law is unwarranted.

The mortgagor's right to the use and

possession of the foreclosed property during the redemption
period is a right created by statute (In Re Nelson, supra),
and has not been affected by this decision.

If Respondents

were really so concerned about this particular aspect of the
problem, they should have addressed the point either in their
Brief or in oral argument.

The court addressed itself to the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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question at that time and has now made its decision.

The

fact that Respondents failed to address themselves to that
question prior to this time does not justify a rehearing,
nor can a rehearing be granted merely because Respondents
feel the question is important —

not in view of the fact

that the Supreme Court has already duly deliberated the
question and has reached its decision.
It is not grounds for rehearing, either, that the
court's decision may be out of harmony with certain former
decisions, especially in light of the fact that this case
is substantially distinguishable from the other cases cited
by Respondents.
A rehearing is inappropriate in this case and the
petition of the Respondents must be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
Kay M. Lewis
JENSEN & LEWIS
320 South 300 East, Suite 1
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendants and
Respondents
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